Hume establishes that the Logical Problem of Evil is an a priori (from definition) proof that God cannot exist because his characteristics contradict each other. Here is a possible reason God might have for allowing natural evil: (MSR2) God allowed natural evil to enter the world as part of Adam and Eve’s punishment for their sin in the Garden of Eden. U. S. A. So, some theists suggest that the real question behind the logical problem of evil is whether (17) is true. As Flew (1955, p. 149) put it, “If there is no contradiction here then Omnipotence might have made a world inhabited by perfectly virtuous people.” Mackie (1955, p. 209) writes. is the contradictory of (40). Greater goods defense. No amount of moral or natural evil, of course, can guarantee that a man will [place his faith in God]…. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Plantinga’s Free Will Defense has been the most famous theistic response to the logical problem of evil because he did more to clarify the issues surrounding the logical problem than anyone else. One argument, known as the free will defense, claims that evil is caused not by God but by human beings, who must be allowed to choose evil if they are to have free will. Natural disasters, it will be said, bear no essential connection to human wrongdoing, so it is absurd to think that moral evil could somehow bring natural evil into the world. Yes. According to Plantinga’s description of morally significant free will, it does not seem that God would be significantly free. Notice that (15) does not say that consistent statements must actually be true at the same time. Atheologians, as we saw above, claim that God is doing something morally blameworthy by allowing evil and suffering to exist in our world. (MSR2) seems to be asking us to believe things that only a certain kind of theist would believe. (Gen. 1:29-30, NIV). It does not require the joint of a consistent set of statements to be plausible. If one is true, the other is false; if one is false, the other is true. Not David Der Romisch Katechumene. Each of these things seems to be absolutely, positively impossible. As an example, a critic of Plantinga’s idea of “a mighty nonhuman spirit” causing natural evils may concede that the existence of such a being is not logically impossible but argue that due to lacking scientific evidence for its existence this is very unlikely and thus it is an unconvincing explanation for the presence of natural evils. Consider W4. It is difficult to see that they do. Because the suggestions of Hick and Stump are clearly logically possible, they, too, succeed in undermining the logical problem of evil. There was no problem of evil before the fall, nor will there be one in the eternal state. But you don’t even need to trouble yourself with finding an actual x. Consider the following descriptions of various worlds. The survey included the question “If you could ask God only one question and you knew he would give you an answer, what would you ask?” The most common response, offered by 17% of those who could think of a question was “Why is there pain and suffering in the world?” (Strobel 2000, p. 29). These tend to fall, however, into two main groups. “Evil and Omnipotence.”, Stump, Eleonore. (31) God is not able to have false beliefs about anything. Originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus, the logical argument from evil is as follows: If an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god exists, then evil does not. (Mackie 1982, p. 154). These inabilities follow not from God’s omnipotence alone but from his omnipotence in combination with his omniscience, moral perfection and the other divine perfections God possesses. In my opinion, the Logical Problem of Evil (LPE) is the strongest argument there is against the existence of God, yet it is surprisingly weak, as I will show you. She writes, Natural evil—the pain of disease, the intermittent and unpredictable destruction of natural disasters, the decay of old age, the imminence of death—takes away a person’s satisfaction with himself. The logical problem of evil questions how there possibly could be evil, given a particular view of God. Thus, it does not appear that, with respect to any choice of morally good and morally bad options, God is free to choose a bad option. If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. According to Edward Madden and Peter Hare (1968, p. 6), natural evil includes. Suppose a gossipy neighbor were to tell you that Mrs. Jones just allowed someone to inflict unwanted pain upon her child. If there is nothing bad in this world, it can only be because the free creatures that inhabit this world have—by their own free will—always chosen to do the right thing. They will somehow no longer be capable of doing wrong. In the second half of the twentieth century, atheologians (that is, persons who try to prove the non-existence of God) commonly claimed that the problem of evil was a problem of logical inconsistency. But whether this offers a real solution of the problem is another question. The idea that God should have forfeited creation is not a new one. Plantinga claims that if someone is incapable of doing evil, that person cannot have morally significant free will. Mackie admits that Plantinga’s defense shows how God and evil can co-exist, that is, it shows that “the central doctrines of theism” are logically consistent after all. Since we haven't any logical certainty about the properties of something who transcend us (like God), I think that there's no logical problem … Any two or three of them might be true at the same time; but there is no way that all of them could be true. `` Logical Problem Of Evil `` By Lee Strobel 1377 Words 6 Pages Seems like each day we turn on our televisions, open up our Internet browsers or turn on our smartphones we’re confronted with some disturbing news of people doing unimaginable acts to each other, to animals, to our planet or horrible things happening to people all across the globe. If you wanted to tell a lie, you would not be able to do so. (17) It is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. The problem of evil is also a theoretical one, usually described and studied by religion scholars in two varieties: the logical problem and the evidential problem. It would be ridiculous to give moral praise to a robot for putting your soda can in the recycle bin rather than the trash can, if that is what it was programmed to do. Theists who want to rebut the logical problem of evil need to find a way to show that (1) through (4)—perhaps despite initial appearances—are consistent after all. Email: beebe “at” yahoo “dot” com Mass murderers and serial killers typically have reasons for why they commit horrible crimes, but they do not have good reasons. What is Plantinga's argument against the logical problem of evil? The logical problem of evil is often referred to as the inconsistent triad, this being that the following propositions; God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and evil exists, are inconsistent. If God eliminated the evil, he would have to eliminate the greater good as well. However, it is not clear that human freedom requires the existence of natural evils like deadly viruses and natural disasters. Because of this you think the logical problem of evil is not in fact a problem at all for Christianity. Is it possible? If … The logical problem of evil is often referred to as the inconsistent triad, this being that the following propositions; God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and evil exists, are inconsistent. That’s W4. The phrase “problem of evil” can be used to refer to a host of different dilemmas arising over the issue of God and evil. God can’t have it both ways. Consistency only requires that it be possible for all of the statements to be true (even if that possibility is never actualized). In other words, it appears that W3 isn’t impossible after all. Returning to the main issue, there does not seem to be anything impossible about God causally determining people in every situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong. J. L. Mackie (1955, p. 200), for example, claimed. If the descriptions of those worlds are inconsistent or contradictory, the worlds in question will be impossible. If God exists, then evil cannot exist. The worlds described will be possible if the descriptions of those worlds are logically consistent. Plantinga can’t put all the blame for pain and suffering on human beings. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and perfectly good. It is also important to note that, simply because Plantinga’s particular use of free will in fashioning a response to the problem of evil runs into certain difficulties, that does not mean that other theistic uses of free will in distinct kinds of defenses or theodicies would face the same difficulties. However, they reveal that some of the central claims of his defense conflict with other important theistic doctrines. The logical problem of evil has been a lynchpin for the atheistic belief of nonexistence of God. One point of conflict concerns the possibility of human free will in heaven. Plantinga doesn’t need to have a single shred of evidence supporting the truth of his suggestion. (30) God is not able to fail to do what he knows to be right. Process theology and open theism are other positions that limit God’s omnipotence and/or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology). The desire to see a theistic response to the problem of evil go beyond merely undermining a particular atheological argument is understandable. An implicit assumption behind this part of the debate over the logical problem of evil is the following: (18) It is not morally permissible for God to allow evil and suffering to occur unless he has a morally sufficient reason for doing so. God can forcibly eliminate evil and suffering (as in W2) only at the cost of getting rid of free will. [4] One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution. Cancer, AIDS, famines, earthquakes, tornadoes, and many other kinds of diseases and natural disasters are things that happen without anybody choosing to bring them about. [3] Most philosophers today reject this argument. The problem of evil is based on the assumption that we know for sure what is good and what is evil for God itself. Persons have morally significant free will if they are able to perform actions that are morally significant. (iii) If despite initial appearances heavenly dwellers do possess morally significant free will, then it seems that it is not impossible for God to create genuinely free creatures who always (of necessity) do what is right. [Statements (6) through (12) purport to show how this is done.] They note that philosophers have always believed it is never rational to believe something contradictory. B. c. God has the desire to eliminate all evil… But once you find out that the pain was caused by a shot that immunized Mrs. Jones’ infant daughter against polio, you would no longer view Mrs. Jones as a danger to society. Instead, Hick claims that human beings are unfinished and in the midst of being made all that God intended them to be. It is not that they will contingently always do what is right and contingently always avoid what is wrong. The Logical Problem of Evil. They will be yours for food. One of the most popular theistic responses to the argument from evil is the Free Will Defense. (MSR2) claims that all natural evil followed as the result of the world’s first moral evil. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not exist. But Plantinga thinks he is mistaken in thinking that W3 is possible and in not recognizing important differences between W3 and W4. This question raises what philosophers call “the problem of evil.”. So the logical problem of evil is not a logical problem at all and does not give us a good reason to reject belief in God. Current discussions of the problem focus on what is called “the probabilistic problem of evil” or “the evidential problem of evil.” According to this formulation of the problem, the evil and suffering (or, in some cases, the amounts, kinds and distributions of evil and suffering) that we find in the world count as evidence against the existence of God (or make it improbable that God exists). However, since (MSR2) deals with the logical problem of evil as it pertains to natural evil (which claims that it is logically impossible for God and natural evil to co-exist), it only needs to sketch a possible way for God and natural evil to co-exist. People in this world couldn’t do morally bad things if they wanted to. The problem of evil is certainly the greatest obstacle to belief in the existence of God. Similarly, the people in the possible world under consideration have no choice about being good. Can they help you today? Statements (6) through (8) jointly imply that if the perfect God of theism really existed, there would not be any evil or suffering. A pit bull attacks a two-year-old child, angrily ripping his flesh and killing him. He would urge those uncomfortable with the idea of limitations on God’s power to think carefully about the absurd implications of a God who can do the logically impossible. Furthermore, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. Peterson (1998, p. 39) writes. According to Plantinga, people in the actual world are free in the most robust sense of that term. (19) God is doing something morally inappropriate or blameworthy in allowing evil to occur. The problem of evil is unusual in objections to religion in that many apologists accept that it is a persuasive and rational criticism of theism. People can freely choose to do what is right only when their actions are not causally determined. Since this is something that God could have done and since a world with free creatures and no evil is better than a world with free creatures and evil, this is something God should have done. But improbability and impossibility, as we said above, are two different things. It is the view that causal determinism is false, that—unlike robots or other machines—we can make choices that are genuinely free. It seems that, although Plantinga’s Free Will Defense may be able to explain why God allows moral evil to occur, it cannot explain why he allows natural evil. Evil is a problem, for the theist, in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil on the one hand and belief in the omnipotence and omniscience of God on the other. The Logical Problem of Evil. Soaked as it is with human suffering and moral evil, how is it possiblethat our world is the work of an almighty, perfectly loving Creator? The logical version of the problem of evil (also known as the a priori version and the deductive version) is the problem of removing an alleged logical inconsistency between certain claims about God and certain claims about evil. That is, that person would not be able to choose any bad option even if they wanted to. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists. So, the objection goes, even if Plantinga’s Free Will Defense explains why God allows moral evil, it does not explain why he allows natural evil. The Logical Problem Of Evil 1535 Words | 7 Pages. Because of this, when they do what is right, they can properly be praised. The evil of extensive animal suffering exists. They could never be praiseworthy. Logical problem of evil. This orthodox view of heaven poses the following significant challenges to Plantinga’s view: (i) If heavenly dwellers do not possess morally significant free will and yet their existence is something of tremendous value, it is not clear that God was justified in creating persons here on Earth with the capacity for rape, murder, torture, sexual molestation, and nuclear war. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and therefore cannot all be correct. The logical problem of evil doesn't apply to these gods, though the evidential problem of evil may still apply. Is W3 possible? Many philosophers think so. How can God be omnipotent and not stop evil? Originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus,[20] the logical argument from evil is as follows: This argument is of the form modus tollens, and is logically valid: If its premises are true, the conclusion follows of necessity.
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